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We review the literature to identify common problems of
decision-making in individuals and groups. We are guided by
a Bayesian framework to explain the interplay between past
experience and new evidence, and the problem of exploring
the space of hypotheses about all the possible states that
the world could be in and all the possible actions that one
could take. There are strong biases, hidden from awareness,
that enter into these psychological processes. While biases
increase the efficiency of information processing, they often
do not lead to the most appropriate action. We highlight the
advantages of group decision-making in overcoming biases
and searching the hypothesis space for good models of the
world and good solutions to problems. Diversity of group
members can facilitate these achievements, but diverse groups
also face their own problems. We discuss means of managing
these pitfalls and make some recommendations on how to
make better group decisions.
1. Why is it hard to make decisions?
Most decisions have to be made in the face of uncertainty and in
the absence of immediate feedback. Making decisions in groups
can reduce uncertainty, and this is one of the reasons why it
is observed frequently throughout the animal kingdom [1,2].
For example, a shoal of fish can follow a light-level gradient
that is too weak a signal for an individual fish to follow [3].
Humans can develop better models of how the world works by
means of discussion [4,5]. However, decision-making in groups
is complex and can go wrong [6,7]. The purpose of this paper is
to review the scientific literature in order to identify pitfalls that
decision-makers—both individuals and those making decisions in
groups—should be aware of and to make recommendations that
can help groups make better decisions.
Our review will mostly be concerned with small groups
who agree on the problem to be solved, such as panels
and committees, although many of the phenomena that we
consider can also be observed in large groups. We adopt a
Bayesian framework which has been shown to capture many
2017 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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aspects of intuitive decision-making [8–10]. The term intuitive is important; it reminds us that we are
not conscious of most of our cognitive processes, which happen automatically and are simply too fast
to reach awareness. We will often refer to the Bayesian distinction between past experience (prior) and
new evidence (likelihood). We will also refer to the need to explore the hypothesis space from which we
select an action. In doing so, our main aim is to understand how decisions can go wrong. Details of the
Bayesian approach can be found in appendix A.
2. Introducing some basic concepts
2.1. Forming beliefs in an uncertain world
2.1.1. Weighting past experience and new evidence
It is important to strike the right balance between, on one hand, past experience and perceived wisdom
and, on the other hand, new evidence. In the middle of the last century, doctors sent large numbers of
children to hospital to have their tonsils and adenoids removed. Such referrals were made even though,
in 1938, the Schools Epidemic Committee of the Medical Research Council concluded: ‘It is a little difficult
to believe that among the mass of tonsillectomies performed to-day all subjects for operation are selected
with true discrimination and one cannot avoid the conclusion that there is a tendency for the operation to
be performed as a routine prophylactic ritual for no particular reason and with no particular result’ [11].
In a more recent empirical study, it was found that, in 1981, 17% of doctors used coronary angiography
inappropriately; they did not keep up with the evidence and stuck with apparently tried and trusted
experience [12,13].
2.1.2. Assessing the reliability of our sources
Even when we make decisions on our own, information often comes from other people. To use this
information appropriately, we need an estimate of the reliability, known as precision in the Bayesian
framework, of our sources. The confidence with which others transmit information can be a useful
marker, but it can also be misleading, even when there is no intention to deceive. These dangers are
present even when evaluating our own judgements. In many situations, the confidence we feel might not
be a good guide. For example, a victim of a crime may sincerely believe that they have a good memory
for the face of the criminal, but select an innocent person in an identity parade [14].
2.2. Finding the best solution
2.2.1. Sampling the hypothesis space
We can think of the task of choosing the best action as one of finding the highest point in a hilly
landscape [15] (figure 1a). The landscape represents a probability distribution over the goodness of
possible actions where the highest probability indicates the best action. But how can we find this
peak? A calculation of the entire distribution is often computationally intractable, and yet there are
many circumstances in which the brain achieves near-optimal solutions [16,17]. One way this might
be achieved is by sampling the probability distribution [15]. By visiting the landscape at different points,
we can form a rough map and thus make a better choice (figure 1b). For example, we may search our
memory for situations similar to the current one [18,19] or ask others for advice [20].
Sampling works well in domains such as perception and motor control where we can draw on a rich
database built through years of experience [21,22]. Its disadvantage is, however, revealed by the errors
that people make in unfamiliar abstract settings; we should engage in unbiased sampling, but, instead,
we fall prey to old habits [23]. Another risk of sampling is that the explorer of the landscape risks getting
stuck on a local peak and thus never discovers that there is a higher peak (figure 1c). Having found such
an apparently satisfying solution, people tend to devote their cognitive resources to justifying it, rather
than looking for a better one [24].
2.2.2. Exploitation and exploration
When we think we know enough, or are running out of time, we exploit our current knowledge to choose
the action that we think will achieve the best outcome. We would normally prefer an outcome of high
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Figure 1. Exploring the landscape of possible actions. (a) The plot shows the probability distribution over the goodness of possible
actions. The peak indicates the best action. (b) A rough estimate of the probability distribution can bemade by drawing samples. (c) If the
sampling is biased, then theestimateof theprobability distributionmaynot reflect the trueone. To create the sample-baseddistributions,
we drew samples from the true probability distribution (N= 14) in a uniform manner (b) or from a sub-part (c), and then applied a
smooth function. We sampled the height of the true probability distribution, akin to remembering how good an action was or asking a
friend for their advice about which action to take.
value, but we also take account of the probability that an outcome will be realized at all [25]. However, as
shown by the success of lotteries [26], estimating the expected value of an action is subject to strong biases.
There are many cases where we do not have sufficient knowledge to make a good decision. In such cases,
we should explore rather than exploit and seek more information before making up our minds [27,28]. Of
course, if we have an exaggerated opinion of the adequacy of our current knowledge, then we may fail
to seek more information. We have already mentioned the observation that some doctors used coronary
angiography inappropriately [12,13]. If they had collected exercise data they would have found that
angiography was unnecessary.
2.3. Hidden biases
In the interest of processing information efficiently, humans employ shortcuts, many of which evolved
by leading to life-saving actions in dire situations [29]. For example, rapidly recognizing an enemy, or
a predator, leads to the good decision to take evasive action. However, in modern life, these biases, left
over from evolution, can cause poor decisions; for example, rejecting a candidate because they are from
an ‘unfamiliar’ group (e.g. because of ethnicity or gender) and trigger a threat response [30]. As modern-
day humans, we are surprised at these ‘outdated’ biases when they are pointed out and strive to be free
of them [31]. There are other kinds of biases too, which depend on individual experience. For example,
one can imagine a culturally dependent bias to stand on the left side of escalators (e.g. Tokyo). While a
useful instinct when in the context in which the bias was learnt, the bias can be offensive when in a new
context where it is customary to stand on the right (e.g. Osaka or London).
3. When individual decisions go wrong
We will now consider some of the ways in which individual decisions can go wrong, and then discuss
how groups can, sometimes, overcome these shortcomings. We will mainly consider decisions where we
are aware of the problem and the answer that we reached but where we need not be aware of how we got
there—even when we do think we know, we might be far off the truth [32]. This mode of decision-making
is the most typical of the workings of small groups.
3.1. Forming wrong beliefs
3.1.1. Too much or too little faith in past experience
A common source of bad decisions is inappropriate prior beliefs. If we have a strong prior belief in
a hypothesis, then we need huge amounts of conflicting evidence to change our mind. For example,
the surgeons performing tonsillectomies in the 1940s had the strong belief that this operation would
be of benefit for all and were not swayed by the report from the Medical Research Council [11]. In
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Figure 2. Misinterpreting new evidence. (a) Galileo was mystified by the appearance of Saturn, which changed over time and appeared
to have ears or arms. Le Opere di Galileo Galilei, XII, Correspondence 1614–1619, Letter 1223. (b) Huygens recognized how these changing
appearances could be explained by a ring. Systema Saturnium (1659), Oeuvres Completes de Christiaan Huygens, XV: 312.
physics, Einstein’s firm belief that the universe was static led him to add an unnecessary parameter (the
cosmological constant: Λ) when he applied his theory of general relativity to the universe [33]. In geology,
the theory of continental drift was rejected for 40 years because of ‘prior theoretical commitments’ to
permanence theory [34]. Conversely, if we have a weak prior belief in a hypothesis, then we need
huge amounts of supporting observations to believe it. For example, most scientists do not believe in
extra-sensory perception (e.g. telepathy) [35]. As a result, they demand much stronger evidence for the
existence of extra-sensory perception than for more widely accepted hypotheses [36]. While perhaps
sensible in the case of extra-sensory perception, such weak prior beliefs have hindered scientific advances
in the past.
3.1.2. Misinterpreting new evidence
It is not the case that faith in prior beliefs is a bad thing. Prior beliefs reflect past experiences with the
world, either on an evolutionary or an individual time scale, and we greatly benefit from these. It is also
not the case that new evidence should be distrusted on principle, because it is imperative that we adapt
to new situations. However, if we are to update our beliefs about the world appropriately, we need to be
able to interpret the new evidence correctly. Here is an example from the history of science. When Galileo
first viewed Saturn through a telescope in 1610, he did not have a good model to explain what he saw. At
one point, he described the planet as having ears (figure 2). It was not until 1655 that Huygens realized
that these ‘ears’ were the rings that surround Saturn [37].
3.1.3. Erroneous evaluation of rare events
When updating our beliefs about the world, whether consciously or unconsciously, we seem to be
especially bad at dealing with rare events; we overestimate their occurrence when our beliefs about
the world are based on information obtained from others, but underestimate them when they are
built from our own experience [38,39]. For example, after reading the leaflet for a prescribed medicine,
we might overestimate the probability that a physical symptom is due to an adverse side effect. By
contrast, a doctor with years of experience prescribing the medicine might underestimate that very same
probability. In this example, the patient overweights the new evidence, whereas the doctor overweights
their past experience.
3.1.4. Too much or too little faith in one’s own abilities
Most people, whether they like it or not, are bad at gauging the accuracy of their beliefs [40]. In a typical
psychological study, people would be asked to indicate their confidence in different judgements (e.g.
that a cloud of dots is moving to the left and not to the right) or propositions (e.g. that Rio de Janeiro
is the capital of Brazil) as a probability of being correct [41]. The researcher would then quantify two
aspects of the relationship between people’s confidence and beliefs [42]. The first one is resolution which
characterizes the extent to which people’s low and high confidence can discriminate between their
incorrect and correct beliefs. The second aspect is calibration which characterizes the extent to which
their stated probability of being correct reflects their objective probability of being correct; for example,
when they say that there is a 70% chance that their belief is correct, then they are also correct 70% of
the time. Calibration in particular is subject to biases. People are often overconfident for hard problems,
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but paradoxically, they tend to be underconfident for easy ones—a phenomenon known as the hard-easy
effect [43–45]. There are, however, significant individual differences in the degree to which people display
under- or over-confidence [46].
3.2. Simple solutions to complex problems and their unforeseen consequences
3.2.1. The Streisand effect
Many problems require a depth of thinking that is beyond our cognitive powers. Even a simple game
like tic-tac-toe can unfold in thousands of different ways. When faced with problems of high complexity,
we tend to resort to heuristic strategies—that is, simple algorithms, or rules of thumb, for selecting an
action [47]. Heuristic strategies can save us time and cognitive effort [48], but they might also have
unintended consequences. One such consequence has become known as the Streisand effect [49]. In 2003,
Barbra Streisand filed a lawsuit to prevent the online posting of a photo of her home. At first sight, this
seems to be the appropriate way to prevent unwanted material being made public. We believe that if
unwanted behaviour is punished then it will cease. Prior to the lawsuit, only six people had downloaded
the photo, two of them being Streisand’s lawyers. After the attention created by the lawsuit, about 400 000
people visited the website [50].
3.2.2. Learning without a model of the world
One heuristic solution to the complexity problem is to use model-free strategies instead of model-based
strategies [51], which are slow to develop [52] and cognitively taxing [53]. Model-free strategies proceed
by storing the outcomes of past actions and then acting upon these values in a habitual manner. For
example, a model-free player of tic-tac-toe might always seek to occupy the centre of the grid, because
such behaviour has been rewarded in the past. By contrast, model-based strategies proceed by building
and updating a model of the world; a model-based player of tic-tac-toe would not rely on old habits, but
draw on an internal model of their opponent, imagining and assessing their future moves. As should
be apparent, for model-free strategies to work well, substantial experience in an unchanging world is
needed [51]. This requirement is, however, rarely satisfied. Even the state of the decision-maker may
change, such that the future state to which the decision is relevant is not the same as the state when the
decision had to be made. As we all know, if we shop when we are hungry, we are likely to make decisions
that our future satiated self would disapprove of [54].
3.2.3. Too few hypotheses
Another heuristic solution to the complexity problem is to consider only a subset of hypotheses about
the world and possible actions. This strategy is particularly likely to be applied to problems where our
past experience is not rich enough to guide sampling of the full space of hypotheses in an adequate
manner [15]. Reduction of this space may, however, lead to bad decisions when too few alternatives are
taken into account [55]. For example, the political scientist Philip Tetlock divided political pundits into
foxes, who consider multiple hypotheses, and hedgehogs, who consider much fewer; in general, the foxes
are more accurate in their predictions, but the media prefer to hear from the hedgehogs [56].
3.2.4. Inertia and optimism bias
The last solution to the complexity problem that we will consider is sampling from memory: instead
of using forward planning, imagining and evaluating the future consequences of an action, we may
decide on an action by recalling what we did the last time that we were in a similar situation [18,19].
This strategy can explain the observation that people tend to repeat past choices regardless of the current
evidence—a bias known as decision inertia [57]. When we do engage in forward planning, we may still use
sampling from memory to inform some of the computations, such as estimating the expected value of
an action. This strategy may, however, lead to distorted estimates if the sampling is biased. For example,
it has been shown that our belief about the probability of an action outcome depends on how desirable
we find that outcome—a phenomenon known as optimism bias [58]. This bias may come about if, when
building expectations from memory, we sample outcomes we like, but ignore outcomes we do not like.
As a result, we may underestimate the probability of undesirable outcomes, such as illness resulting from
smoking, and overestimate the probability of desirable outcomes, such as winning the lottery or our new
restaurant being a hit. Interestingly, when gathering new information, we seem to prefer sources which
give us good news, which only biases our memory further [59].
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4. The advantages of decision-making in groups
Many of the problems of individual decision-making can be mitigated if individuals join with others
to make decisions in a group. We will consider group scenarios where people work together or
independently. We will not discuss the nature and function of group leaders as this is a field in its own
right [60–62]. However, in the Recommendations section, we will mention some situations in which a
group chair or leader can help mitigate the problems specific to group decision-making.
4.1. Forming better beliefs
4.1.1. Benefits of pooling information
As a statistical rule of thumb, pooling information across independent individuals leads to more reliable
information [63,64]. For example, pooling unbiased but noisy numerical estimates causes uncorrelated
errors to cancel out and therefore increases the precision of the pooled estimate (see appendix B1). Here,
estimation errors may be uncorrelated, because people base their estimates on different past experiences
or new evidence. The benefit of pooling information across individuals was first shown by Francis
Galton [65]. He collected together the individual entries for a ‘guess the weight of the ox’ competition
and showed that the average of these entries was closer to the truth than the single winning entry. This
effect has been replicated experimentally for small groups [4,66] and large groups [1,67].
4.1.2. Wisdom of crowds
The promise of pooling information underpins recent attempts to harness the wisdom of crowds [68].
Central to these attempts has been the development of methods for combining individual judgements
in cases where it is hard to establish people’s expertise or honesty, such as when information is elicited
over the Internet [69,70]. For some domains, the method used need not be complex. For example, a
recent set of studies showed that, by adopting the decision favoured by the majority of independent
dermatologists, the accuracy of skin and breast cancer diagnosis can be improved over and above the
single-best individual [71–73]. This approach to diagnosis can overcome some of the issues revealed by
advocates of evidence-based medicine [12].
4.1.3. Majority decisions
A common strategy for combining individual opinions into a group decision is to let each member vote
on the available options and select the option favoured by the majority [74,75]. This majority rule may
be perceived as the fairest solution if group members have very different preferences. However, the
outcome of this process critically depends on the reliability of the information upon which individual
opinions were based. It is therefore often advisable to use a weighted majority rule where individual
reliability is taken into account (figure 3). But how should reliability be assessed?
4.1.4. Social markers of reliability
One marker of reliability is status [76,77]. Group members may enjoy high status because of their rank
(pay grade), seniority (time in office) or experience (he has been to war)—traits which we view as
markers of reliability [78–80]. Another marker of reliability is the confidence with which an opinion
is expressed [81–84]. Group members may express high confidence, because they have relevant past
experience (prior) or strong evidence (likelihood) [41]. One solution to the weighting problem may
be to ask each individual for an estimate of the proportion of people that they think will share their
opinion: intriguingly, it can be shown that a procedure which assigns higher weight to opinions
that are more popular than predicted generates better decisions than either the majority rule or the
confidence-weighted alternative [70].
4.1.5. The remarkable success of open discussion
Discussion among members of small groups, when there is no time pressure, has proved an excellent
strategy for making good use of the knowledge held by group members [85–91]. The reason revealed in
these studies is that discussion involves a recalibration of markers of reliability. By arguing for or against
the opinions put forward, we can assess the evidence on which each opinion was based [24]. In general,
we are more likely to be swayed by a well-argued opinion than an opinion that is merely stated with
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Figure 3. Weighting by reliability. The figure shows that the reliability of a pooled estimate is higher when each individual estimate is
weighted by its reliability (weighted averaging) than when assigning equal weights to all individual estimates (simple averaging). In
this simulation, we assumed that the individual estimates varied in terms of their reliability and were uncorrelated. See appendix B2 for
mathematical details.
high confidence [91]. By means of such recalibration, we can together increase the probability that no
opinion is assigned undue weight.
4.2. Finding better solutions
4.2.1. Pooling cognitive resources
Groups have been shown to outperform individuals for many problems of probability and
reasoning [92,93]. For example, in the Wason selection task, a well-known problem of logic, only 10–
20% of individuals give the correct answer, but this increases for groups to around 70%. Groups also
outperform individuals in economic games (e.g. Beauty-Contest) [94]; find more efficient solutions to
numerical problems (e.g. calculating tax returns) [83,95] and reach a level of abstraction for scientific
topics (e.g. the concept of biological transmission) that is higher than expected from the sum of the
members working alone [96]. Importantly, the benefits of having worked in a group can transfer to
individual contexts, with individuals retaining good strategies developed together with others [83,92].
4.2.2. Combining efforts of explorers and exploiters
We can distinguish between people who tend to be exploiters and those who tend to be explorers [97].
Exploiters prefer to stay with their current model of the world, rather than switch to another. They
consider a small part of the hypothesis space, refining the solution that first came to mind. Explorers,
in contrast, prefer breadth. They consider a much larger part of the hypothesis space and are therefore
less likely to be trapped on a local maximum. Their exploration activity, on the other hand, means that
they may decide to act when it is too late [27]. The extent to which people exploit or explore is in part
a matter of personality and of genetics [98]. Many animal groups, from honeybees to humans, contain a
mixture of exploiters and explorers. A typical swarm of 10 000 honeybees will contain between 300 and
500 scout bees [99]. A mixture of such diverse individuals can create advantages for the group.
4.3. Overcoming hidden biases
Groups can help us discover the ‘beam that is in thine own eye’ (Matthew 7:3, KJV). While our own biases
are often hidden from ourselves, we are remarkably good at detecting others’ biases [100,101]. Another
way in which groups can help individuals overcome individual biases is by changing the incentive
structure of the problem at hand, either indirectly (e.g. reputation loss or gain) or directly (e.g. financial
loss or gain). In some tasks, for example, group members spontaneously perform better than they would
have had they been doing the task alone [102,103]. This enhancement, known as the Köhler effect [104], is
thought to arise because group members do not want to be perceived as the weakest link [103,105]. When
providing financial incentives, it is critical to strike a balance between individual incentives, which are
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Figure 4. Information-limiting correlations. The figure shows that the reliability of a pooled estimate saturates when the pooled
information is correlated. In this simulation, we assumed that the individual estimates were equally reliable and correlated to a low,
medium or high degree. See appendix B3 for mathematical details.
distributed unevenly within the group, and group incentives, which are distributed evenly [106]: while
individual incentives improve the speed of group decisions, group incentives improve accuracy [107].
Decisions, however, often cannot be both fast and accurate [108].
5. When group advantages are dissipated
Groups can overcome some, but not all, of the problems of individual decision-making. We will now
consider a number of potential pitfalls facing group decisions, such as lack of independent knowledge,
biases that skew the sharing of information or preferences and the problem of competing individual and
group goals.
5.1. Lack of independent knowledge
Groupthink is perhaps the most well-known cause of bad group decisions. The term, which was
popularized by the psychologist Irvin Janis in his case study of the Bays of Pigs Invasion [7], has been
used with many meanings, but a common theme is that group members become less independent and
behave as if they were a supersized individual. There are largely two causes of a lack of independence.
First, group members are too similar to each other: their knowledge is based on similar past experiences
and/or similar new evidence. Second, group members, even when initially dissimilar, adapt to each
other’s knowledge through social interaction. As a consequence of such correlations, individual errors
are no longer independent and the benefit of pooling information across group members is reduced
(figure 4).
5.1.1. Group members are too similar to each other
It is often unavoidable that members of a group have had similar past experiences and therefore hold
similar expectations about the world. In our social life, we tend to get together with people with whom
we share backgrounds and personal characteristics [109]. In the workplace, we are often paired with
people who have taken a path in life not too different from our own [109]. This tendency for ‘birds of
a feather to flock together’ can increase group cohesion, but it can also have a negative effect on group
decisions. When group members hold similar prior beliefs, their inferences will be biased in similar
ways. This problem cannot be alleviated by asking group members to work independently. For example,
members of the same political party are likely to interpret incoming data in the same way regardless of
whether they discuss their interpretation with each other.
It is also often unavoidable that members of a group acquire similar information about the world.
Similar people tend not only to have similar past experiences but also to acquire new evidence in similar
ways. For example, they may read the same newspapers or listen to the same radio programmes. This
problem is amplified on the Internet where search engines (e.g. Google) and social media (e.g. Facebook)
organize content according to our location and browsing history—promoting information that fits our
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preferences, those of our friends or people who are estimated to be like us [110]. This personalization
facilitates the creation of filter bubbles [111] and echo chambers [112] where information is created and
recycled by like-minded individuals. When group members obtain correlated evidence, their conclusions
will covary—regardless of whether they have correlated past experiences [113].
5.1.2. Group members converge too strongly
We have considered how individuals can hold non-independent knowledge because of circumstantial
factors. Individuals may, however, actively adapt to each other’s knowledge through group
interactions—a phenomenon studied under the headings of herding, conformity and social influence [114–
116]. Here, we distinguish between two types of social influence: people may adapt to each other’s
knowledge because of a desire to fit into the group or through believing that others have better
knowledge.
5.1.3. Desire to fit into the group
A classic example of social compliance is Salomon Asch’s line-judgement experiment [117]. Groups
of eight male students were shown lines of varying length and asked to announce in turn which one
matched a reference line. All but one of the participants were actors, instructed by Asch to give the
wrong answer. Surprisingly, participants, who were seated such that they would always announce their
answer last, yielded to the majority about 40% of the time, despite privately knowing the correct answer.
More everyday examples include not admitting to our highbrow friends that we prefer milk chocolate
and sweet wine.
5.1.4. Believing that others have better knowledge
In uncertain situations, individuals can gain information by observing others. When we are ignorant
or learning is too tedious, we do well to ‘copy the majority’ or ‘copy the most successful’. These
shortcuts capitalize on the facts that behaviours tend to be popular for a reason and that people tend
to be successful because their behaviour is adaptive [20]. When we ourselves have useful information,
these shortcuts may seem less useful. Still, we often ignore our own instincts and follow others
instead [118,119]. For example, we may join a long queue of shoppers at a market stall because we
assume that others are shopping there for a good reason. We may do this even if we believe that the
goods at the stall are of dubious provenance. The psychological assumption that others typically act on
good information can explain why beliefs and behaviours can rapidly spread through a group—in a so-
called information cascade [119]—and why rational agents can make decisions that go against their own
better knowledge.
5.1.5. Information cascade
Financial bubbles are an instructive example of an information cascade. A financial bubble is typically
defined as the trading of an asset at a price that is much higher than its intrinsic, or true, value. It is,
however, important to bear in mind that financial bubbles are identified in retrospect, once there has
been a sudden drop in the price of the asset. During the build-up of a financial bubble, an individual
trader may be uncertain about the true value of the asset and therefore be justified in inferring that
buyers of the asset are acting on good evidence. For example, the trader may believe that the buyers
have inside information that the asset is about to increase in value. In a sense, the trader is behaving as if
the market is an agent with beliefs and intentions [120]. In this way, small fluctuations in trading activity
can end up having huge financial implications.
5.2. Hidden group biases
5.2.1. Shared information bias
One well-established finding in the scientific literature is that group discussions tend to focus on
information that is shared by all group members, often at the expense of information that is essential but
only held by a minority [121]. This phenomenon is known as shared information bias or the hidden-profile
effect. For example, a fellowship or a grant panel, which is often made up of people with different areas of
expertise, may focus on factors that everybody is familiar with, such as an applicant’s track record, and
pay less attention to the parts which require specialist knowledge, such as the risk involved in using a
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new method [122]. As a result, the success of an application may depend more on the composition of the
reviewing panel than the quality of the proposed work. There are a number of reasons for this focus on
shared information. Circumstantial factors play a role. Shared information is more likely to be sampled,
because it is held by a greater number of people [123]. The need to make fast decisions makes it less likely
that important but time-consuming information is discussed [124]. Psychological factors also play a role.
Group members may focus on shared information to increase their standing in the group as others tend
to like us more, and judge us as more competent, if we know what they already know [125].
5.2.2. Amplifying biases
Groups often amplify the initial preference held by the majority of its members—an effect known as
group polarization [126,127]. For example, when the initial preference of the majority is risk-seeking, then
the group may take on more risk than its members would have done on their own [128]. By contrast,
when the initial preference of the majority is risk-averse, then the group may make more cautious choices
than its members would have done on their own [129]. Group polarization has been shown in high-stake
situations, including courts of law. Here, jury members tend to shift towards harsher or more lenient
verdicts after deliberation [130], and groups of judges take more extreme courses of action [131] than
would have been expected given their initial preference.
There are different theories about this phenomenon [127,132]. One explanation is that preferences
are spread by contagion, similar to moods [133] and automatic behaviours [134]. Evidence shows that
the way in which our brain represents expected value adapts to relevant others; for example, a usually
patient person, who interacts with an impatient other, comes to prefer immediate gratification [135,136].
Another factor is uncertainty about our own preferences [137], which makes us look to others for
cues [138]. If we hear new arguments in favour of an initially weak preference, then it may make sense
to strengthen it.
5.3. Competing goals
5.3.1. Status and accountability
Because humans have many complex and competing goals, it is only to be expected that some of us are
more concerned with our status and reputation in the group than with making a good decision [139]. These
motives can have disastrous consequences. Examples that have been prominent in the media are plane
crashes and surgical errors where junior individuals did not voice valid concerns or were ignored by
more senior colleagues [140,141]. A related factor which can become a preoccupation for group members
is accountability—that is, the expectation that they will be asked to justify their opinions or actions to
the group [142,143]. Group members may go to great lengths to lessen accountability. For example, they
may shift their opinion towards the majority view regardless of their initial position. In contrast, when
they are constrained by past commitments, they often spend their time justifying their initial position—a
phenomenon known as defensive bolstering [143]. While the former behaviour may lead to the suppression
of valid but minority viewpoints, the latter may waste valuable time and resources.
5.3.2. Social loafing
In many cases, individuals can enjoy the fruits of others’ labour, exerting no or minimal effort themselves.
This problem, known as social loafing or free-riding, occurs when group members can receive an equal
share of a group benefit regardless of individual contribution (e.g. free healthcare funded by taxes
or a shared grade for a school project). As a result, the group benefit may be depleted too soon, or
not be as great as it could have been had everyone given their best. The classic example of social
loafing is rope pulling where groups of individuals exert less effort than when they pull the rope
individually—a relationship which only grows with group size (the Ringelmann effect; [144]). Several
factors promote social loafing [145]: the belief that one’s contribution cannot be identified, the belief that
one’s contribution is dispensable and the expectation that others will free-ride on one’s contribution.
Some people are more likely to hold these beliefs. For example, males [145], individuals from Western
societies [145] and individuals who view themselves as better than average [146,147] are more likely to
engage in social loafing, possibly because they have an inflated sense of the extent to which others will
benefit ‘unfairly’ from their contribution.
 on August 17, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
11
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:170193
................................................
6. Diversity as a means of recovering group advantages
A solution to the problem of group members becoming too similar to each other is to increase the
diversity of the group.
6.1. Identity and functional diversity
We can distinguish between identity diversity, which refers to differences in personal characteristics such
as gender, age and cultural background, and functional diversity, which refers to differences in how
people cognitively represent and solve problems [148]. Identity diversity stimulates individual thought;
people who are not like us make us reconsider our own position [149,150], reducing the risk of being
stuck on a local peak when a better solution exists [151]. Functional diversity, which can be facilitated by
identity diversity [152,153], ensures that the group more thoroughly searches the hypothesis space for
better models of the world and better solutions to the problem at hand [148].
6.2. Cognitive division of labour
One common strategy for increasing functional diversity in a group is to assign each individual
a unique role or area of expertise [154]. For example, in businesses, co-workers often develop,
spontaneously or deliberately, transactive memory systems through which they encode, store and retrieve
knowledge [155,156]. In particular, in the encoding stage, group members identify each other’s areas of
expertise. In the storage stage, information is passed on to the group member with the relevant expertise,
which ensures fast individual learning with minimal effort. In the retrieval stage, a group member
wishing to obtain certain information can simply turn to the established expert. If the information
turns out to be unreliable, then the assignment of areas of expertise is revised, and the weight of the
information source is adjusted. A transactive memory system thus allows groups of individuals to divide
the search through the space of hypotheses and compare solutions refined by experts. The effectiveness
of the system can be improved by appointing a ‘meta-knowledge’ champion who is aware of everyone’s
expertise and functions as a catalyst for information exchange [157].
7. Problems created by diverse groups
We can think of a group of people with different areas of expertise as a super-brain [158]. The group
members correspond to populations of neurons which perform different functions, but whose output is
brought together to make sense of the world [159]. There is, however, more room for error in groups than
in the brain. The brain has already solved the problem of competition for influence [160] and relies on a
central executive system to coordinate information processing [161]. Having a diverse group of people
may result in time-consuming processes that in the end may not avoid miscommunication [152,153].
7.1. Inappropriate assessment of reliability and confidence
We have seen how groups can make better decisions by weighting each opinion by its reliability
(figure 3). It is, however, hard to judge the reliability of others’ opinions if they are different from
ourselves. In these cases, we often resort to inappropriate shortcuts. For example, we may view someone
who is able to talk for a long time about a topic as an expert, but, as we all know, the most talkative
people are not always right [162,163]. Even among highly educated people, women tend to be implicitly
perceived as less competent than men [164]. This hidden bias can lead to the opinion of a women being
ignored until it is voiced again by a man (figure 5).
Another reason why it can be hard to judge the reliability of others’ opinions is that markers of
reliability reflect many different factors. Take confidence as an example. There is an interesting and
possibly surprising link between a person’s status and their readiness to take risks confidently [165].
When our status is high, we have a lot to lose when proved wrong, and this makes us more cautious.
However, when our status is low, we can be bold, as we have everything to gain if we turn out to
be correct. Furthermore, there is often an ambiguous link between ability and confidence. Ironically,
less competent individuals tend to have an inflated sense of their own ability [166]. There are also
substantial individual differences in overt confidence, which vary with individual characteristics, such as
personality [167], gender [168] and culture [169]. This variation increases the risk of miscommunication
among diverse group members. The complexity brought out by diverse groups is perhaps one of the
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”That’s an excellent suggestion, Miss Triggs. Perhaps one of the
men here would like to make it.”
Figure 5. The influence of an opinion on group decisions sometimes does not depend on how good it is but on who voiced it.
reasons why we tend to feel more comfortable in groups of individuals with similar background and
cultural identity [109,170,171].
7.2. Equality bias
So far, we have not touched on genuine differences in ability, but of course they exist and, to come to
a good decision, it is often necessary to discard, or at least discount, the opinions of less competent
group members. This turns out to be difficult for us to do. Studies have shown that there is a bias
in small groups to treat everyone as equal in terms of ability and thus assign an equal weight to
each opinion [172]. In addition, members of small groups have been shown to match each other’s
overt confidence, further blurring differences in ability [173]. There are various possible explanations
of such equality bias; perhaps it serves to avoid conflict [174] or to diffuse the responsibility for difficult
decisions [175]. The consequence of the bias is that, if a poor solution to a task is offered by an
incompetent member and responses are pooled, this will inevitably drag down the accuracy of the group
decision. When attempting to increase group diversity, we need to pay close attention to differences in
ability. This is a tall order, as ability can be hard to assess in the absence of prior interactions or immediate
feedback.
8. Recommendations
Our discussion of the literature builds on our interest in how groups of individuals make sense of
information about the world, and how research can inform real-world decision-making. The findings
that we have discussed are especially relevant to the workings of small groups, such as panels and
committees, that make appointments and award grants. Such groups are committed to making good
decisions and strive to make even better decisions. Many of the issues we have covered will merely
seem good sense and have already been adopted in practice (e.g. at the Royal Society [172]). But, as is
so often the case, it is easier to spot good sense in hindsight. With this in mind, what recommendations
can we give?
8.1. Harnessing diversity
We have seen that having a diverse group of people facilitates the search for good models of the world
and good solutions to problems [176,177]. There is, however, no guarantee that diverse groups will make
better decisions than homogeneous groups. Sometimes, diversity leads to conflict, and no decision can
be made at all. Sometimes, it causes miscommunication about who is more likely to be correct and the
 on August 17, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
13
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:170193
................................................
wrong action is taken. We have a ‘Goldilocks’ situation: individuals who differ too much can be as bad
as individuals who are too similar. To harness the benefits of diversity, we must manage it appropriately.
8.1.1. Recruiting diversity
There is evidence for bringing together individuals who differ in terms of their identity (e.g. gender,
age or culture), cognitive style (e.g. explore and exploit) and preferences (e.g. desires and goals). First,
diversity in identity reduces the harmful effects of correlated past experiences and evidence: diverse
people will tend to draw on different experiences and gather information in different ways. Second,
diversity in cognitive style ensures a wider coverage of the hypothesis space over possible states of the
world and possible actions that one could take [176]. Finally, diversity in preferences can decrease group
polarization; when there is no single preference that is favoured by the majority of the group, individual
differences smooth out rather than amplify [178,179].
8.1.2. Fostering diversity
Diversity may be built into the architecture of a group through specialization; specialization decreases
the overlap of group members’ knowledge, solutions and preferences [154]. One way to achieve
specialization in an ad hoc manner is to divide the current task into sub-tasks. Offering individual
incentives for completion of a sub-task, or holding individuals directly accountable for a sub-task, can
facilitate specialization [180]. One advantage of increased identifiability of individual roles is that it
reduces social loafing [181,182], perhaps because of the prospect of negative evaluation [183]. However,
increased accountability can have unwanted side effects, such as group members suppressing original
ideas for fear of negative evaluation [184], or wasting time and resources trying to defend exactly why
they did as they did [143].
8.1.3. Avoiding miscommunication
If group members do not have a shared frame of reference, this can make information exchange
inefficient. For example, when a grant panel scores applications, panellists from different backgrounds
may give a different meaning to the grades on the scoring scale. In this case, tallying the grades can be
very misleading [185–188]. Another example of this communication problem comes from the world of
geopolitical forecasting which deals in statements of uncertainty. In the CIA note NIE 29–51, ‘Probability
of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951’, Sherman Kent and his colleagues at the Office of National Estimates
wrote: ‘Although it is impossible to determine which course the Kremlin is likely to adopt, we believe that
[ . . . ] an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility [emphasis added]’ [189].
When asked by the chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff to put a number on
‘serious possibility’, Mr Kent asked his colleagues which odds they had in mind. It turned out that
the intelligence officers, all expert forecasters, had very different odds in mind, ranging from 20–80
(20%) to 80–20 (80%) in favour of an invasion, rendering the recommendation useless. To avoid such
miscommunication, a shared metric for exchanging information must be agreed upon at the outset of
group discussions [81,86,173].
8.2. How to avoid common traps
8.2.1. Weighting opinions
The risks of equality bias can be countered if group members have equal competence at the task in
hand [172]. Failing this, groups could decide to explicitly weight individual contributions [190]. Both
are tricky: objective measures of competence are hard to come by and markers of reliability may be
misleading.
8.2.2. Anonymous interaction
The risks of social conformity can sometimes be avoided by granting anonymity [191]. For example, the
value of anonymous opinions is appreciated in pre-publication reviews. Honest feedback from peers
and experienced experts is crucial for science to advance, but is difficult to realize in social situations. An
unwanted side effect of anonymity is that it carries the well-known risk of free-riding and self-interest
going undetected [145,192].
 on August 17, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
14
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:170193
................................................
8.2.3. Uncovering information
There are various techniques which may help groups overcome shared information bias. One of them,
instructed dissent, is to ask a subset of group members to play devil’s advocate [193], always adopting the
position opposite to the current consensus, or to ask each group member to adopt a position regardless
of their individual stance [194]. A problem, however, is that contrived advocacy often has less influence
on the listener compared to genuine advocacy, possibly because the arguments for an adopted position
are made with less confidence [195]. Another technique is to have a no-interruption rule; it tends to be
unshared ideas, or group members who bring diversity to the discussion, such as women in male-
dominated environments, who are cut short [196]. Each group member may also be allocated a fixed
amount of floor time as speaking time tends to correlate with factors that are not relevant to the task
at hand, such as power and gender [197,198]. Finally, when time permits, long discussions increase the
probability that unshared information is eventually brought up [199].
8.2.4. Explicit rules
While free interaction is a good way to search the hypothesis space, it may also lead to a rapid narrowing
of ideas; for example, group members may fixate on a small part of the hypothesis space or adapt
to each other’s ideas too quickly [114,116]. One technique designed to help groups overcome such
information loss is the Delphi method, developed by members of the RAND Corporation in the 1950s [200].
This method has been shown to lead to better group decisions than unconstrained discussion for a
variety of tasks [201]. In its classic form, group members privately outline their individual opinion and
rationale; this information is then passed on to a moderator who collates an anonymized summary;
group members are presented with this information and given the opportunity to revise their initial
opinion; this process is repeated until consensus, or some pre-specified stop criterion, is reached [202].
There are several reasons why the Delphi method works: there is no fixation of the group discussion;
anonymity removes the issues of evaluation apprehension and defensive bolstering; there is less room
for production blocking as group members do not have to compete for speaking time, nor can they
interrupt each other’s train of thought; and the iterative process allows for individual changes of mind
once good arguments surface [202].
8.2.5. Good leadership
Because of the complexities of group decision-making, it is wise to have a monitoring process in place.
This can be achieved through a group chair or leader. The chair should make explicit the precise pitfalls
that the decision-making process should avoid. The chair should be aware of the range of biases that
might be at play and point them out when they occur. The chair should be particularly sensitive to
group members not agreeing on the nature of the problem to be solved. In this case, discussion of their
respective solutions will not be fruitful. Experience suggests that, sometimes, different ideas about which
course of action is best to take may be rooted in different ideas about the problem at hand. Here, much
time can be wasted in arguing about seemingly alternative solutions, which are, in fact, solutions to
entirely different problems. Another important role of the group leader is to take into account the long-
term goals of the group, especially when these are in conflict with immediate goals. For the overall
effectiveness of a group, and the quality of its decisions over time, listening to everyone can be important,
even if that means overweighting poor information for specific decisions. This is less the case for one-off
panels assembled for a particular purpose, but it is a significant factor in building an effective group to
deliver a long-term project. The chair should also be aware of the trade-off between speed and accuracy.
Sometimes, the group moves too slowly and loses out on other opportunities. Sometimes, the group
moves too quickly and delivers bad decisions as a result.
9. Conclusion
Our focus on biases may have given the impression that biases are something that we always need to
overcome to make good decisions. However, this is not the story that we want to propagate. Biases are
the reality of our cognitive system. It is the cost we pay for efficiency. We can think of biases as priors in
the Bayesian framework. These priors have been passed on to us partly by nature and partly by culture.
They often stand us in good stead. Biases can help us make decisions in novel situations where our
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learned habits cannot guide us. They avoid dithering, which can be fatal. But, biases are a bad thing
when they are out of date and inappropriate. They can also lead us to get stuck on local maxima.
Can we change our biases consciously? We are not usually conscious of our biases at the time we
make a decision, but we can reflect on them afterwards and they are malleable. They are also more
obvious to others, especially diverse others, than they are to ourselves, and can thus be the subject of
discussion. Why should we wish to change our biases? The reason is simple: if we surrendered to our
biases wholesale, there would only ever be business as usual, and we would not improve our models of
the world and find better solutions to the many problems that we face.
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Appendix A. Bayesian inference
Hypotheses play a central role in decision-making: when we make a decision, we typically weigh up
the evidence in favour of, and the evidence against, competing hypotheses about the current problem
and how best to solve it. For example, by examining a patient’s medical history and test results, a doctor
seeks to identify the diagnosis that is most likely to be correct and the treatment that is most likely to be
successful. Ideally, we wish to use a principled method for evaluating a hypothesis and for updating it
as new evidence arrives. Bayesian inference achieves exactly that by leveraging past experience and new
evidence in a statistical manner. The fundamental Bayesian idea is that we can represent our degree of
belief in a hypothesis as a probability. We can therefore use the laws of probability to update our degree
of belief as new evidence comes to light.
The workhorse in Bayesian inference is Bayes’ theorem, named after Thomas Bayes (1701–1761). The
theorem allows us to ask: what is the probability that a hypothesis is true given the new evidence? There
are two major components that enter into this calculation. The first component is the prior. The prior
describes our degree of belief in the hypothesis before considering the new evidence; it encapsulates
background information and relevant past experience. The second component is the likelihood. The
likelihood describes how consistent we think the new evidence is with the hypothesis; for example,
how likely we think we are to observe heads on 9 out of 10 coin tosses under the hypothesis that the
coin is fair. The likelihood critically depends on our model of how the world works; for example, we assume
that coins fall either way equally often if they are fair. Another term that we need to understand is the
posterior. This is the integration of the prior and the likelihood. The posterior describes our degree of
belief in the hypothesis after incorporating the new evidence; it can be used to evaluate the goodness of
the hypothesis, and it can function as the prior in the next iteration of Bayes’ rule. We illustrate Bayes’
rule and Bayesian updating in figures 6 and 7.
Why is it important that we take into account both the prior and the likelihood? Consider the example
in figure 6. A doctor administers a diagnostic test for prostate cancer, which makes correct detections in
75% of cases and gives false positives in only 10%. What is the probability that the patient has prostate
cancer given a positive result? Most people, even some doctors, will suggest about 70%, focusing on the
result of the diagnostic test [203]. If, however, prostate cancer is only found in 4% of men, then, as the
calculation in figure 6 shows, the correct answer is only about 24%. It is also important that we take into
account the precision of the prior and the likelihood. If the estimate of the base rate of prostate cancer is
vague or comes from an unreliable source, then we should give more weight to the diagnostic test. In
Bayesian inference, precision can be implemented by representing beliefs with probability distributions
rather than single point estimates. We illustrate the concept of precision in figure 8.
Appendix B. Group performance under different strategies
For all simulations, we assumed that the group and its members are estimating the value of a continuous
variable (e.g. the weight of an Ox as in Galton’s classic study). We explored the effect of different
strategies and circumstances on the precision (reliability) of the joint estimate.
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p (hypothesis |evidence) = p (evidence |hypothesis) × p (hypothesis)
p (evidence |all hypotheses)
posterior likelihood prior
normalizing constant 
(a) Bayes’ theorem
(b) Diagnostic inference
p (+cancer |positive) =
p (positive |+cancer) × p (+cancer)
p (positive |+cancer) × p (+cancer) + p (positive |−cancer) × p (−cancer)
0.238 =
0.75 × 0.04
0.75 × 0.04 + 0.10 × 0.96
What is the probability that the patient has cancer given a positive test result? 
Inserting known probabilities
p (positive |−cancer)
p (positive|+cancer)
p (−cancer)
p (+cancer)
en
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e
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la
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n
Figure 6. Bayesian inference. (a) Bayes’ theorem. Here, ‘p’ means probability and ‘|’ means given, so p(hypothesis|evidence) means
probability that the hypothesis is true given the evidence. The normalizing constant, which is not discussed in the appendix, is the
marginal likelihood of observing the data irrespective of the hypothesis and ensures that the posterior probabilities for the different
hypotheses add up to 1. (b) Using Bayes’ theorem in diagnostic inference. A doctor wishing to compute the probability that a patient
has prostate cancer given a positive test result, p(+cancer|positive). We know that the test makes correct detections in 75% of cases,
p(positive|+cancer)= 0.75, and gives false positives in 10% of cases, p(positive|−cancer)= 0.10. We also know that the base-rate of
prostate cancer is only 4%, p(+cancer)= 0.04.
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Figure 7. Bayesian updating. We are presented with a biased coin that gives heads on 30% of tosses. Each heat map shows how our
posterior (colours) over hypotheses about coin bias (vertical axis) evolves as we observe more andmore coin tosses (horizontal axis). The
white line indicates the true value. The prior at a given point in time is the posterior from the previous point in time. The prior for time 1
was set to be (a) flat across hypothesis, (b) centred on the truth or (c) centred on a wrong value.
B.1. Reliability of joint estimate grows with group size
We assume that the individual estimate, x, of each group member, i, is sampled from a Gaussian
distribution, N(s, σ 2), where the mean, s, is the value of the variable being estimated and where the
standard deviation, σ , is set to 1. We assume that the group computes its joint estimate by averaging the
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Figure8. Precision. The plot shows the prior, the likelihood and the posterior representedwith probability distributions rather than point
estimates (i.e. single numbers). We consider a biased coin as in figure 7. The width of a distribution is known as its variance and precision
is the inverse of variance: 1/variance. When the prior and the likelihood are integrated, the posterior distribution will move towards the
more precise component. Note that, because we combinemultiple sources of information, the posterior distribution is more precise than
either of the two distributions.
individual estimates:
z = 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi,
where n is the group size. Since the errors of individual estimates follow a Gaussian distribution, the
error of the joint estimate will do the same. For a given group size, the standard deviation of the joint
estimate is
σgroup = σ√
n
,
and the precision of the joint estimate is
pgroup = 1
σ 2group
.
It turns out that there is a linear relationship between group size and reliability.
B.2. It is important to weight opinions by their reliability
We assume that the individual estimate, x, of each group member, i, is sampled from a Gaussian
distribution, N(s, σ 2i ), where the mean, s, is the value of the variable being estimated and where the
standard deviation, σ i, is sampled uniformly from the range 1–4. As such, the estimates of the best
group member can have up to 16 times less variance than the worst group member. When the individual
estimates differ in terms of their precision, the optimal strategy is to weight each estimate by its precision:
zoptimal =
∑n
i=1 pixi∑n
i=1 pi
,
where n is the group size. Under this optimal strategy, the precision of the joint estimate is the sum of
individual precisions:
poptimal =
n∑
i=1
pi,
where the individual precision is pi = 1/σ 2i .
The simple averaging strategy does not take into account individual precision:
z = 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi,
where n is the group size. For a given group size, the standard deviation of the joint estimate is
σ 2simple =
∑n
i=1 σ 2i
n2
,
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and the precision of the joint estimate is
psimple =
1
σ 2simple
.
We computed each data point for the figure by averaging across 1000 simulations.
B.3. Correlated opinions reduce the reliability of the joint estimate
We assume that the individual estimate, x, of each group member, i, is sampled from a multivariate
Gaussian distribution, N(s,Σ), where s is the mean vector
s=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
s
...
s
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ,
where s is the same for all group members, and where Σ is the covariance matrix in which Σ j,j = 1 and
Σ j,k = r for i = j, where r describes the correlation between individual estimates. Here, we used r= 0.1,
r= 0.3 and r= 0.6. We assumed that the group computes its joint estimate, z, by averaging the individual
estimates:
z = 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi.
By conducting simulations, we can compute the expected variance under the simple averaging
strategy as the squared error of the mean joint estimate:
σ 2group =
∑q
l=1 z
2
l
q
,
where q is the number of simulations. We can then compute the expected precision under the simple
averaging strategy as
pgroup = 1
σ 2group
.
We computed each data point for the figure by averaging across 1000 simulations.
References
1. Couzin ID. 2009 Collective cognition in animal
groups. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 36–43. (doi:10.1016/
j.tics.2008.10.002)
2. Sumpter DJT. 2006 The principles of collective
animal behaviour. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 361, 5–22.
(doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1733)
3. Berdahl A, Torney CJ, Ioannou CC, Faria JJ, Couzin
ID. 2013 Emergent sensing of complex
environments by mobile animal groups. Science
339, 574–576. (doi:10.1126/science.1225883)
4. Bahrami B, Olsen K, Latham PE, Roepstorff A, Rees
G, Frith CD. 2010 Optimally interacting minds.
Science 329, 1081–1085. (doi:10.1126/science.
1185718)
5. Shea N, Boldt A, Bang D, Yeung N, Heyes C, Frith
CD. 2014 Supra-personal cognitive control and
metacognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 186–193.
(doi:10.1016/j.tics.2014.01.006)
6. Bang D, Mahmoodi A, Olsen K, Roepstorff A, Rees
G, Frith CD, Bahrami B. 2014 What failure in
collective decision-making tells us about
metacognition. In The cognitive neuroscience of
metacognition (eds SM Fleming, CD Frith). Berlin,
Germany: Springer.
7. Janis I. 1982 Groupthink: psychological studies of
policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin.
8. Griffiths TL, Chater N, Kemp C, Perfors A,
Tenenbaum JB. 2010 Probabilistic models of
cognition: exploring representations and inductive
biases. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 357–364. (doi:10.1016/
j.tics.2010.05.004)
9. Huys QJM, Guitart-Masip M, Dolan RJ, Dayan P.
2015 Decision-theoretic psychiatry. Clin. Psychol.
Sci. 3, 400–421. (doi:10.1177/216770261456
2040)
10. Pouget A, Beck JM, MaWJ, Latham PE. 2013
Probabilistic brains: knowns and unknowns. Nat.
Neurosci. 16, 1170–1178. (doi:10.1038/nn.3495)
11. Glover JA. 1938 The incidence of tonsillectomy in
school children. Proc. R. Soc. Med. 31,
1219–1236. (doi:10.1007/BF02751831)
12. Chassin MR. 1987 How coronary angiography is
used. JAMA 258, 2543. (doi:10.1001/jama.1987.
03400180077030)
13. Shekelle PG, Ortiz E, Rhodes S, Morton SC, Eccles
MP, Grimshaw JM, Woolf SH. 2001 Validity of the
agency for healthcare research and quality clinical
practice guidelines. JAMA 286, 1461. (doi:10.1001/
jama.286.12.1461)
14. Leippe MR. 1980 Effects of integrative memorial
and cognitive processes on the correspondence of
eyewitness accuracy and confidence. Law Hum.
Behav. 4, 261–274. (doi:10.1007/BF01040618)
15. Sanborn AN, Chater N. 2016 Bayesian brains
without probabilities. Trends Cogn. Sci. 12,
883–893. (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.10.003)
16. Wolpert DM. 2007 Probabilistic models in human
sensorimotor control. Hum. Mov. Sci. 26, 511–524.
(doi:10.1016/j.humov.2007.05.005)
17. Yuille A, Kersten D. 2006 Vision as Bayesian
inference: analysis by synthesis? Trends Cogn. Sci.
10, 301–308. (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.002)
18. Gershman SJ, Daw ND. 2017 Reinforcement
learning and episodic memory in humans and
animals: an integrative framework. Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 68, 101–128. (doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-
122414-033625)
19. Shadlen MN, Shohamy D. 2016 Decision making
and sequential sampling frommemory. Neuron
90, 927–939. (doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2016.
04.036)
20. Heyes C. 2016 Who knows? Metacognitive social
learning strategies. Trends Cogn. Sci. 20, 204–213.
(doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.12.007)
21. Fiser J, Berkes P, Orbán G, Lengyel M. 2010
Statistically optimal perception and learning: from
behavior to neural representations. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 14, 119–130. (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.01.003)
22. Orbán G, Berkes P, Fiser J, Lengyel M. 2016 Neural
variability and sampling-based probabilistic
 on August 17, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
19
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:170193
................................................
representations in the visual cortex. Neuron 92,
530–543. (doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2016.09.038)
23. Tversky A, Kahneman D. 1974 Judgment under
uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science 185,
1124–1131. (doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124)
24. Mercier H. 2016 The argumentative theory:
predictions and empirical evidence. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 20, 1–12. (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.07.
001)
25. Rangel A, Camerer C, Montague PR. 2008 A
framework for studying the neurobiology of
value-based decision making. Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
9, 545–556. (doi:10.1038/nrn2357)
26. Kearney MS. 2005 State lotteries and consumer
behavior. J. Public Econ. 89, 2269–2299.
(doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.07.004)
27. Cohen JD, McClure SM, Yu AJ. 2007 Should I stay or
should I go? How the human brain manages the
trade-off between exploitation and exploration.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 362, 933–942. (doi:10.1098/
rstb.2007.2098)
28. Daw ND, O’Doherty JP, Dayan P, Dolan RJ,
Seymour B. 2006 Cortical substrates for
exploratory decisions in humans. Nature 441,
876–879. (doi:10.1038/nature04766)
29. Cosmides L, Tooby J. 2013 Evolutionary psychology:
new perspectives on cognition and motivation.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 64, 201–229. (doi:10.1146/
annurev.psych.121208.131628)
30. Dovidio JF, Kawakami K, Gaertner SL. 2002 Implicit
and explicit prejudice and interracial interaction.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 82, 62–68. (doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.82.1.62)
31. Plant EA, Devine PG. 2009 The active control of
prejudice: unpacking the intentions guiding
control efforts. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 96, 640–652.
(doi:10.1037/a0012960)
32. Shea N, Frith CD. 2016 Dual-process theories and
consciousness: the case for ‘Type Zero’ cognition.
Neurosci. Conscious. 2016, niw005. (doi:10.1093/
nc/niw005)
33. Nussbaumer H. 2014 Einstein’s conversion from his
static to an expanding universe. Eur. Phys. J. H 39,
37–62. (doi:10.1140/epjh/e2013-40037-6)
34. Oreskes N. 1988 The rejection of continental drift.
Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci. 18, 311–348. (doi:10.2307/
27757605)
35. Shermer M. 2003 Psychic drift. Why most scientists
do not believe in ESP and psi phenomena. Sci.
Am. 288, 31. (doi:10.1038/scientificamerican
0203-31)
36. Wagenmakers E, Wetzels R, Borsboom D, van der
Maas HL. 2011 Why psychologists must change the
way they analyze their data: the case of psi:
comment on Bem (2011). J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 100,
426–432. (doi:10.1037/a0022790)
37. van Helden A. 1975 Annulo Cingitur: the solution of
the problem of Saturn. J. Hist. Astron. 5, 155–174.
(doi:10.1177/002182867400500302)
38. Hertwig R, Erev I. 2009 The description-experience
gap in risky choice. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 517–523.
(doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.09.004)
39. Kahneman D, Tversky A. 1979 Prospect theory: an
analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47,
263. (doi:10.2307/1914185)
40. Fleming SM, Dolan RJ, Frith CD. 2012
Metacognition: computation, biology and
function. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 367, 1280–1286.
(doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0021)
41. Harvey N. 1997 Confidence in judgment. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 1, 78–82. (doi:10.1016/S1364-6613
(97)01014-0)
42. Fleming SM, Lau HC. 2014 How to measure
metacognition. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8, 443.
(doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00443)
43. Gigerenzer G, Hoffrage U, Kleinbölting H. 1991
Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory
of confidence. Psychol. Rev. 98, 506–528.
(doi:10.1037/0033-295X.98.4.506)
44. Moore DA, Healy PJ. 2008 The trouble with
overconfidence. Psychol. Rev. 115, 502–517.
(doi:10.1037/0033-295X.115.2.502)
45. Zylberberg A, Roelfsema PR, Sigman M. 2014
Variance misperception explains illusions of
confidence in simple perceptual decisions.
Conscious Cogn. 27, 246–253. (doi:10.1016/
j.concog.2014.05.012)
46. Ais J, Zylberberg A, Barttfeld P, Sigman M. 2016
Individual consistency in the accuracy and
distribution of confidence judgments. Cognition
146, 377–386. (doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.
10.006)
47. Gigerenzer G. 2008 Why heuristics work. Perspect.
Psychol. Sci. 3, 20–29. (doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.
2008.00058.x)
48. Christian B, Griffiths T. 2016 Algorithms to live by:
the computer science of human decisions. New York,
NY: Henry Holt and Co.
49. Nabi Z. 2014 Censorship is futile. First Monday, 19.
(http://arxiv.org/abs/1411.0225v1 [cs.CY])
50. Jansen SC, Martin B. 2015 The Streisand effect and
censorship backfire. Int. J. Commun. 9, 16.
51. Dayan P, Berridge KC. 2014 Model-based and
model-free Pavlovian reward learning:
revaluation, revision, and revelation. Cogn. Affect.
Behav. Neurosci. 14, 473–492. (doi:10.3758/s13415-
014-0277-8)
52. Decker JH, Otto AR, Daw ND, Hartley CA. 2016 From
creatures of habit to goal-directed learners:
tracking the developmental emergence of
model-based reinforcement learning. Psychol. Sci.
27, 848–858. (doi:10.1177/0956797616639301)
53. Smittenaar P, FitzGerald THB, Romei V, Wright ND,
Dolan RJ. 2013 Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex decreases model-based in favor of
model-free control in humans. Neuron 80,
914–919. (doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.08.009)
54. Gilbert DT, Gill MJ, Wilson TD. 2002 The future is
now: temporal correction in affective forecasting.
Organ. Behav. Hum. Dec. Process. 88, 430–444.
(doi:10.1006/obhd.2001.2982)
55. Chevalley T, SchaekenW. 2016 Considering too few
alternatives: the mental model theory of
extensional reasoning. Quart. J. Exp. Psychol. 69,
728–751. (doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1049622)
56. Tetlock PE. 2005 Expert political judgment: how
good is it? How can we know? Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
57. Akaishi R, Umeda K, Nagase A, Sakai K. 2014
Autonomous mechanism of internal choice
estimate underlies decision inertia. Neuron 81,
195–206. (doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.10.018)
58. Sharot T. 2011 The optimism bias. Curr. Biol. 21,
R941–R945. (doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.10.030)
59. Hunt LT et al. 2016 Approach-induced biases in
human information sampling. PLoS Biol. 14,
e2000638. (doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.20
00638)
60. Dyer JR, Johansson A, Helbing D, Couzin ID, Krause
J. 2009 Leadership, consensus decision making
and collective behaviour in humans. Phil. Trans. R.
Soc. B 364, 781–789. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0233)
61. Goethals GR. 2005 Presidential leadership. Annu.
Rev. Psychol. 56, 545–570. (doi:10.1146/annurev.
psych.55.090902.141918)
62. Kastenmüller A, Greitemeyer T, Zehl S, Tattersall
AJ, George H, Frey D, Fischer P. 2014 Leadership
and information processing. Soc. Psychol. 45,
357–370. (doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000177)
63. Ariely D, Au WT, Bender RH, Budescu DV, Dietz CB,
Gu H, Wallsten TS, Zauberman G. 2000 The effects
of averaging subjective probability estimates
between and within judges. J. Exp. Psychol. Appl.
6, 130–147. (doi:10.1037/1076-898X.6.2.130)
64. Johnson TR, Budescu DV, Wallsten TS. 2001
Averaging probability judgments: Monte Carlo
analyses of asymptotic diagnostic value. J. Behav.
Decis. Making 14, 123–140. (doi:10.1002/bdm.369)
65. Galton F. 1907 Vox populi. Nature 75, 450–451.
(doi:10.1038/075450a0)
66. Migdał, P, Raczaszek-Leonardi J, Denkiewicz M,
Plewczynski D. 2012 Information-sharing and
aggregation models for interacting minds. J. Math.
Psychol. 56, 417–426. (doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2013.
01.002)
67. Krause J, Ruxton GD, Krause S. 2010 Swarm
intelligence in animals and humans. Trends Ecol.
Evol. 25, 28–34. (doi:10.1016/j.tree.2009.06.016)
68. Surowiecki J. 2004 The wisdom of crowds. New
York, NY: Anchor Books.
69. Prelec D. 2004 A Bayesian truth serum for
subjective data. Science 306, 462–466.
(doi:10.1126/science.1102081)
70. Prelec D, Seung HS, McCoy J. 2017 A solution to the
single-question crowd wisdom problem. Nature
541, 532–535. (doi:10.1038/nature21054)
71. Kurvers R, Herzog SM, Hertwig R, Krause J, Carney
PA, Bogart A, Argenziano G, Zalaudek I, Wolf M.
2016 Boosting medical diagnostics by pooling
independent judgments. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA
113, 8777–8782. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1601827113)
72. Kurvers RHJM, Krause J, Argenziano G, Zalaudek I,
Wolf M. 2015 Detection accuracy of collective
intelligence assessments for skin cancer diagnosis.
JAMA Dermatol. 151, 1. (doi:10.1001/jamadermatol.
2015.3149)
73. Wolf M, Krause J, Carney PA, Bogart A, Kurvers
RHJM. 2015 Collective intelligence meets medical
decision-making: the collective outperforms the
best radiologist. PLoS ONE 10, 1–10. (doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0134269)
74. Laughlin PR. 1999 Collective induction: twelve
postulates. Organ. Behav. Hum. Dec. Proc. 80,
50–69. (doi:10.1006/obhd.1999.2854)
75. Sorkin RD, West R, Robinson DE. 1998 Group
performance depends on the majority rule.
Psychol. Sci. 9, 456–463. (doi:10.1111/1467-9280.
00085)
76. Insko CA, Gilmore R, Moehle D, Lipsitz A, Drenan S,
Thibaut JW. 1982 Seniority in the generational
transition of laboratory groups: the effects of
social familiarity and task experience. J. Exp. Soc.
Psychol. 18, 557–580. (doi:10.1016/0022-1031(82)
90073-7)
77. Kirchler E, Davis JH. 1986 Consensus and member
position change. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 83–91.
(doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.83)
 on August 17, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
20
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:170193
................................................
78. Barton MA, Bunderson JS. 2014 Assessing member
expertise in groups: an expertise dependence
perspective. Organ. Psychol. Rev. 4, 228–257.
(doi:10.1177/2041386613508975)
79. Bunderson JS. 2003 Recognizing and utilizing
expertise in work groups: a status characteristics
perspective. Admin. Sci. Quart. 48, 557.
(doi:10.2307/3556637)
80. Bunderson JS, Barton MA. 2010 Status cues and
expertise assessment in groups. In Status in
management and organizations (ed. JL Pearce), pp.
215–237. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
81. Bang D et al. 2014 Does interaction matter? Testing
whether a confidence heuristic can replace
interaction in collective decision-making.
Conscious. Cogn. 26, 13–23. (doi:10.1016/j.concog.
2014.02.002)
82. Koriat A. 2012 When are two heads better than one
and why? Science 336, 360–362. (doi:10.1126/
science.1216549)
83. Laughlin PR, Ellis AL. 1986 Demonstrability and
social combination processes on mathematical
intellective tasks. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 22, 177–189.
(doi:10.1016/0022-1031(86)90022-3)
84. Zarnoth P, Sniezek JA. 1997 The social influence of
confidence in group decision making. J. Exp. Soc.
Psychol. 33, 345–366. (doi:10.1006/jesp.1997.1326)
85. Bahrami B, Olsen K, Bang D, Roepstorff A, Rees G,
Frith C. 2012 What failure in collective
decision-making tells us about metacognition.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc B 367, 1350–1365. (doi:10.1098/
rstb.2011.0420)
86. Fusaroli R, Bahrami B, Olsen K, Roepstorff A, Rees
G, Frith CD, Tylen K. 2012 Coming to terms:
quantifying the benefits of linguistic coordination.
Psychol. Sci. 23, 931–939. (doi:10.1177/0956797
612436816)
87. Graefe A, Armstrong JS. 2011 Comparing
face-to-face meetings, nominal groups, Delphi
and prediction markets on an estimation task. Int.
J. Forecast. 27, 183–195. (doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.
2010.05.004)
88. Klein N, Epley N. 2015 Group discussion improves
lie detection. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 112,
7460–7465. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1504048112)
89. Mercier H, Trouche E, Yama H, Heintz C, Girotto V.
2015 Experts and laymen grossly underestimate
the benefits of argumentation for reasoning.
Think. Reason. 21, 341–355. (doi:10.1080/13546783.
2014.981582)
90. Minson JA, Liberman V, Ross L. 2011 Two to tango:
effects of collaboration and disagreement on
dyadic judgment. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 37,
1325–1338. (doi:10.1177/0146167211410436)
91. Trouche E, Sander E, Mercier H. 2014 Arguments,
more than confidence, explain the good
performance of reasoning groups. J. Exp. Psychol.
Gen. 143, 1958–1971. (doi:10.1037/a0037099)
92. Maciejovsky B, Sutter M, Budescu DV, Bernau P.
2013 Teams make you smarter: how exposure to
teams improves individual decisions in probability
and reasoning tasks.Manage. Sci. 59, 1255–1270.
(doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1668)
93. Moshman D, Geil M. 1998 Collaborative reasoning:
evidence for collective rationality. Think. Reason.
4, 231–248. (doi:10.1080/135467898394148)
94. Kocher MG, Sutter M. 2005 The decision maker
matters: individual versus group behaviour in
experimental beauty-contest games. Econ. J. 115,
200–223. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00966.x)
95. Laughlin PR, Hatch EC, Silver JS, Boh L. 2006
Groups perform better than the best individuals
on letters-to-numbers problems: effects of group
size. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 90, 644–651. (doi:10.10
37/0022-3514.90.4.644)
96. Schwartz DL. 1995 The emergence of abstract
representations in dyad problem solving. J. Learn.
Sci. 4, 321–354. (doi:10.1207/s15327809jl
s0403_3)
97. Badre D, Doll B, Long N, FrankM. 2012 Rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex and individual differences in
uncertainty-driven exploration. Neuron 73,
595–607. (doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.12.025)
98. Frank MJ, Doll BB, Oas-Terpstra J, Moreno F. 2009
Prefrontal and striatal dopaminergic genes predict
individual differences in exploration and
exploitation. Nat. Neurosci. 12, 1062–1068.
(doi:10.1038/nn.2342)
99. Seeley TD. 2010 Honeybee democracy. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
100. Pronin E, Berger J, Molouki S. 2007 Alone in a
crowd of sheep: asymmetric perceptions of
conformity and their roots in an introspection
illusion. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 92, 585–595.
(doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.585)
101. Pronin E, Gilovich T, Ross L. 2004 Objectivity in the
eye of the beholder: divergent perceptions of bias
in self versus others. Psychol. Rev. 111, 781–799.
(doi:10.1037/0033-295X.111.3.781)
102. Bahrami B, Didino D, Frith CD, Butterworth B, Rees
G. 2013 Collective enumeration. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percept. Perform. 39, 338–347. (doi:10.1037/
a0029717)
103. Weber B, Hertel G. 2007 Motivation gains of
inferior group members: a meta-analytical review.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 93, 973–993. (doi:10.1037/00
22-3514.93.6.973)
104. Köhler O. 1926 Kraftleistungen bei Einzel-und
Gruppenabeit. Industrielle Psychotechnik 4,
209–226.
105. Hertel G, Kerr NL, Messé, LA. 2000 Motivation
gains in performance groups: paradigmatic and
theoretical developments on the Köhler effect.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 79, 580–601. (doi:10.1037/
0022-3514.79.4.580)
106. Farr JL. 1976 Incentive schedules, productivity, and
satisfaction in work groups: a laboratory study.
Organ. Behav. Hum. Perform. 17, 159–170.
(doi:10.1016/0030-5073(76)90059-3)
107. Beersma B, Hollenbeck JR, Humphrey SE, Moon H,
Conlon DE, Ilgen DR. 2003 Cooperation,
competition, and team performance: toward a
contingency approach. Acad. Manage. J. 46,
572–590. (doi:10.2307/30040650)
108. Heitz RP. 2014 The speed-accuracy tradeoff:
history, physiology, methodology, and behavior.
Front. Neurosci. 8, 1–19. (doi:10.3389/fnins.2014.
00150)
109. McPherson M, Smith-Lovin L, Cook JM. 2001 Birds
of a feather: homophily in social networks. Annu.
Rev. Sociol. 27, 415–444. (doi:10.1146/annurev.
soc.27.1.415)
110. Bozdag E. 2013 Bias in algorithmic filtering and
personalization. Ethics. Inf. Technol. 15, 209–227.
(doi:10.1007/s10676-013-9321-6)
111. Pariser E. 2011 The filter bubble: what the Internet is
hiding from you. New York, NY: Penguin Press.
112. Sunstein CR. 2001 Repulic.com. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
113. Averbeck BB, Latham PE, Pouget A. 2006 Neural
correlations, population coding and computation.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 7, 358–366. (doi:10.1038/
nrn1888)
114. Cialdini RB, Goldstein NJ. 2004 Social influence:
compliance and conformity. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 55,
591–621. (doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.
090902.142015)
115. Raafat RM, Chater N, Frith CD. 2009 Herding in
humans. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 420–428.
(doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.08.002)
116. Toelch U, Dolan RJ. 2015 Informational and
normative influences in conformity from a
neurocomputational perspective. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 19, 579–589. (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.
07.007)
117. Asch SE. 1951 Effects of group pressure upon the
modification and distortion of judgment. In
Groups, leadership and men (ed. H Guetzkow), pp.
177–190. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press.
118. Anderson LR, Holt CA. 1997 Information cascades
in the laboratory. Am. Econ. Rev. 87, 847–862.
119. Bikhchandani S, Hirshleifer D, Welch I. 1992 A
theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural
change as informational cascades. J. Polit. Econ.
100, 992. (doi:10.1086/261849)
120. De Martino B, O’Doherty J, Ray D, Bossaerts P,
Camerer C. 2013 In the mind of the market: theory
of mind biases value computation during financial
bubbles. Neuron 79, 1222–1231. (doi:10.1016/
j.neuron.2013.07.003)
121. Kerr NL, Tindale RS. 2004 Group performance and
decision making. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 55, 623–655.
(doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142009)
122. van Arensbergen P, van der Weijden I, van den
Besselaar P. 2014 The selection of talent as a group
process. A literature review on the social dynamics
of decision making in grant panels. Res. Eval. 23,
298–311. (doi:10.1093/reseval/rvu017)
123. Stasser G, Titus W. 1985 Pooling of unshared
information in group decision making: biased
information sampling during discussion. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 48, 1467–1478. (doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.48.6.1467)
124. Kruglanski AW, Webster DM. 1996 Motivated
closing of the mind: ‘seizing’ and ‘freezing’.
Psychol. Rev. 103, 263–283. (doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.103.2.263)
125. Wittenbaum GM, Hubbell AP, Zuckerman C. 1999
Mutual enhancement: toward an understanding
of the collective preference for shared information.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 77, 967–978. (doi:10.1037/00
22-3514.77.5.967)
126. Lamm H. 1988 A review of our research on group
polarization: eleven experiments on the effects of
group discussion on risk acceptance, probability
estimation, and negotiation positions. Psychol.
Rep. 62, 807–813. (doi:10.2466/pr0.1988.62.
3.807)
127. Myers DG, Lamm H. 1976 The group polarization
phenomenon. Psychol. Bull. 83, 602–627.
(doi:10.1037/0033-2909.83.4.602)
128. Wallach MA, Kogan N, Bem DJ. 1962 Group
influence on individual risk taking. J. Abnorm. Soc.
Psychol. 65, 75–86. (doi:10.1037/h0044376)
129. Fraser C, Gouge C, Billig M. 1971 Risky shifts,
cautious shifts, and group polarization. Eur. J. Soc.
 on August 17, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
21
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:170193
................................................
Psychol. 1, 7–30. (doi:10.1002/ejsp.24200
10103)
130. Myers DG, Kaplan MF. 1976 Group-induced
polarization in simulated juries. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Bull. 2, 63–66. (doi:10.1177/014616727600200114)
131. Main EC, Walker TG. 1973 Choice shifts and extreme
behavior: judicial review in the federal courts.
J. Soc. Psychol. 91, 215–221. (doi:10.1080/00224545.
1973.9923044)
132. Kerr NL, Maccoun RJ, Kramer GP. 1996 Bias in
judgment: comparing individuals and groups.
Psychol. Rev. 103, 687–719. (doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.103.4.687)
133. Barsade SG. 2002 The ripple effect: emotional
contagion and its influence on group behavior.
Admin. Sci. Quart. 47, 644–675. (doi:10.2307/
3094912)
134. Chartrand TL, Bargh JA. 1999 The chameleon
effect: the perception-behavior link and social
interaction. J. Pers. Soc. 76, 893–910.
(doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.893)
135. Garvert MM, Moutoussis M, Kurth-Nelson Z,
Behrens TEJ, Dolan RJ. 2015 Learning-induced
plasticity in medial prefrontal cortex predicts
preference malleability. Neuron 85, 418–428.
(doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2014.12.033)
136. Suzuki S, Jensen ELS, Bossaerts P, O’Doherty JP.
2016 Behavioral contagion during learning about
another agent’s risk-preferences acts on the neural
representation of decision-risk. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci.
USA 113, 3755–3760. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1600092113)
137. Vlaev I, Chater N, Stewart N, Brown GDA. 2011 Does
the brain calculate value? Trends Cogn. Sci. 15,
546–554. (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.008)
138. Moutoussis M, Dolan RJ, Dayan P. 2016 How
people use social information to find out what to
want in the paradigmatic case of inter-temporal
preferences. PLoS Comput. Biol. 12, e1004965.
(doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004965)
139. Insko CA, Smith RH, Alicke MD, Wade J, Taylor S.
1985 Conformity and group size: the concern with
being right and the concern with being liked. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Bull. 11, 41–50. (doi:10.1177/01461
67285111004)
140. Cosby KS, Croskerry P. 2004 Profiles in patient
safety: authority gradients in medical error. Acad.
Emerg. Med. 11, 1341–1345. (doi:10.1111/j.1553-
2712.2004.tb01925.x)
141. Sasou K, Reason J. 1999 Team errors: definition and
taxonomy. Rel. Eng. Syst. Saf. 65, 1–9. (doi:10.1016/
S0951-8320(98)00074-X)
142. Lerner JS, Tetlock PE. 1999 Accounting for the
effects of accountability. Psychol. Bull. 125,
255–275. (doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.2.255)
143. Tetlock PE, Skitka L, Boettger R. 1989 Social and
cognitive strategies for coping with accountability:
conformity, complexity, and bolstering. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 57, 632–640. (doi:10.1037/0022-3514.
57.4.632)
144. Kravitz DA, Martin B. 1986 Ringelmann
rediscovered: the original article. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 50, 936–941. (doi:10.1037/0022-3514.
50.5.936)
145. Karau SJ, Williams KD. 1993 Social loafing: a
meta-analytic review and theoretical integration.
J. Person. Soc. Psychol. 65, 681–706.
(doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.4.681)
146. Charbonnier E, Huguet P, Brauer M, Monteil J-M.
1998 Social loafing and self-beliefs: people’s
collective effort depends on the extent to which
they distinguish themselves as better than others.
Soc. Behav. Pers. Int. J. 26, 329–340. (doi:10.2224/
sbp.1998.26.4.329)
147. Huguet P, Charbonnier E, Monteil J. 1999
Productivity loss in performance groups: people
who see themselves as average do not engage in
social loafing. Group Dyn. Theory Res. Pract. 3,
118–131. (doi:10.1037/1089-2699.3.2.118)
148. Hong L, Page SE. 2004 Groups of diverse problem
solvers can outperform groups of high-ability
problem solvers. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 101,
16 385–16 389. (doi:10.1073/pnas.0403723101)
149. Antonio AL, Chang MJ, Hakuta K, Kenny DA, Levin
S, Milem JF. 2004 Effects of racial diversity on
complex thinking in college students. Psychol. Sci.
15, 507–510. (doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.
00710.x)
150. Loyd DL, Wang CS, Phillips KW, Lount RB. 2013
Social category diversity promotes premeeting
elaboration: the role of relationship focus. Organ.
Sci. 24, 757–772. (doi:10.1287/orsc.1120.0761)
151. Østergaard CR, Timmermans B, Kristinsson K. 2011
Does a different view create something new? The
effect of employee diversity on innovation. Res.
Policy 40, 500–509. (doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.
11.004)
152. Polzer JT, Milton LP, SwannWBJ. 2002 Capitalizing
on diversity: interpersonal congruence in small
work groups. Acad. Manage. Proc. Membership Dir.
47, 296–324. (doi:10.2307/3094807)
153. Roberge MÉ, van Dick R. 2010 Recognizing the
benefits of diversity: when and how does diversity
increase group performance? Hum. Resour.
Manage. Rev. 20, 295–308. (doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.
2009.09.002)
154. Stasser G, Stewart DD, Wittenbaum GM. 1995
Expert roles and information exchange during
discussion: the importance of knowing who knows
what. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 31, 244–265. (doi:10.10
06/jesp.1995.1012)
155. Hollingshead AB, Brandon DP. 2003 Potential
benefits of communication in transactive memory
systems. Hum. Commun. Res. 29, 607–615.
(doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2003.tb00859.x)
156. Wegner DM. 1995 A computer network model of
human transactive memory. Soc. Cogn. 13,
319–339. (doi:10.1521/soco.1995.13.3.319)
157. Mell JN, Van Knippenberg D, Van Ginkel WP. 2014
The catalyst effect: the impact of transactive
memory system structure on team performance.
Acad. Manage. J. 57, 1154–1173. (doi:10.5465/amj.
2012.0589)
158. Hoffecker JF. 2013 The information animal and the
super-brain. J. Archaeol. Method. Theory 20, 18–41.
(doi:10.1007/s10816-011-9124-1)
159. Hölldobler B, Wilson EO. 2008 The superorganism:
the beauty, elegance, and strangeness of insect
societies. New York, NY: W.W. Norton &
Company.
160. Desimone R, Duncan J. 1995 Neural mechanisms of
selective visual attention. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 18,
193–222. (doi:10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.
001205)
161. Miller EK, Cohen JD. 2001 An integrative theory of
prefrontal cortex function. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24,
167–202. (doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.167)
162. Littlepage GE, Schmidt GW, Whisler EW, Frost AG.
1995 An input-process-output analysis of influence
and performance in problem-solving groups.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 69, 877–889. (doi:10.1037/
0022-3514.69.5.877)
163. Littlepage GE, Silbiger H, Mueller AL. 1997
Recognition and utilization of expertise in
problem-solving groups: expert characteristics
and behavior. Group Dyn. Theory Res. Prac. 1,
324–328. (doi:10.1037/1089-2699.1.4.324)
164. Moss-Racusin CA, Dovidio JF, Brescoll VL, Graham
MJ, Handelsman J. 2012 Science faculty’s subtle
gender biases favor male students. Proc. Natl Acad.
Sci. USA 109, 16 474–16 479. (doi:10.1073/pnas.
1211286109)
165. Bayarri MJ, Degroot MH. 1989 Optimal reporting of
predictions. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 84, 214–222.
(doi:10.1080/01621459.1989.10478758)
166. Kruger J, Dunning D. 1999 Unskilled and unaware
of it: how difficulties in recognizing one’s own
incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 77, 1121–1134. (doi:10.1037/
0022-3514.77.6.1121)
167. Campbell WK, Goodie AS, Foster JD. 2004
Narcissism, confidence, and risk attitude. J. Behav.
Decis. Making 17, 297–311. (doi:10.1002/bdm.475)
168. Barber BM, Odean T. 2001 Boys will be boys:
gender, overconfidence, and common stock
investment. Q. J. Econ. 116, 261–292. (doi:10.1162/
003355301556400)
169. Mann L, Radford M, Burnett P, Ford S, Bond M,
Leung K, Nakamura H, Vaughan G, Yang K-S. 1998
Cross-cultural differences in self-reported
decision-making style and confidence. Int. J.
Psychol. 33, 325–335. (doi:10.1080/00207599
8400213)
170. Mackinnon SP, Jordan CH, Wilson AE. 2011
Birds of a feather sit together: physical similarity
predicts seating choice. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Bull. 37, 879–892. (doi:10.1177/0146167211402094)
171. Neimeyer RA, Mitchell KA. 1988 Similarity and
attraction: a longitudinal study. J. Soc. Pers.
Relat. 5, 131–148. (doi:10.1177/026540758800
500201)
172. Mahmoodi A et al. 2015 Equality bias impairs
collective decision-making across cultures. Proc.
Natl Acad. Sci. USA 112, 3835–3840. (doi:10.1073/
pnas.1421692112)
173. Bang D et al. 2017 Confidence matching in group
decision-making. Nat. Hum. Behav. 1, 117.
(doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0117)
174. Tuncel E, Mislin A, Kesebir S, Pinkley RL. 2016
Agreement attraction and impasse aversion:
reasons for selecting a poor deal over no deal at
all. Psychol. Sci. 27, 312–321.
175. Forsyth DR, Zyzniewski LE, Giammanco CA. 2002
Responsibility diffusion in cooperative collectives.
Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 28, 54–65. (doi:10.1177/
0146167202281005)
176. Hong L, Page SE. 2001 Problem solving by
heterogeneous agents. J. Econ. Theory 97, 123–163.
(doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2709)
177. Levine SS, Apfelbaum EP, Bernard M, Bartelte VL,
Zajac EJ, Stark D. 2014 Ethnic diversity deflates
price bubbles. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 111,
18 524–18 529. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1407301111)
178. Couzin ID, Ioannou CC, Demirel G, Gross T, Torney
CJ, Hartnett A, Conradt L, Levin SA, Leonard NE.
2011 Uninformed individuals promote democratic
consensus in animal groups. Science 334,
1578–1580. (doi:10.1126/science.1210280)
 on August 17, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
22
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:170193
................................................
179. Yaniv I. 2011 Group diversity and decision quality:
amplification and attenuation of the framing
effect. Int. J. Forecast. 27, 41–49. (doi:10.1016/
j.ijforecast.2010.05.009)
180. Baumeister RF, Ainsworth SE, Vohs KD. 2016 Are
groups more or less than the sum of their
members? The moderating role of individual
identification. Behav. Brain Sci. 39, e137.
(doi:10.1017/S0140525X15000618)
181. Williams KD, Harkins SG, Latané, B. 1981
Identifiability as a deterrant to social loafing: two
cheering experiments. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 40,
303–311. (doi:10.1037/0022-3514.40.2.303)
182. Williams KD, Nida SA, Baca LD, Latane B. 1989
Social loafing and swimming: effects of
identifiability on individual and relay performance
of intercollegiate swimmers. Basic Appl. Soc.
Psychol. 10, 73–81. (doi:10.1207/s15324834
basp1001_7)
183. Harkins SG, Szymanski K. 1989 Social loafing and
group evaluation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 56,
934–941. (doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.6.934)
184. Cottrell NB, Wack DL, Sekerak GJ, Rittle RH. 1968
Social facilitation of dominant responses by the
presence of an audience and the mere presence of
others. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 9, 245–250.
(doi:10.1037/h0025902)
185. Beers PJ, Boshuizen HPA, Kirschner PA, Gijselaers
WH. 2006 Common ground, complex problems
and decision making. Group Decis. Negot. 15,
529–556. (doi:10.1007/s10726-006-9030-1)
186. Budescu DV, Broomell S, Por H-H. 2009 Improving
communication of uncertainty in the reports of
the intergovernmental panel on climate change.
Psychol. Sci. 20, 299–308. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02284.x)
187. Morreau M. 2016 Grading in groups. Econ. Philos.
32, 323–352. (doi:10.1017/S02662671150
00498)
188. Taylor AL, Dessai S, de Bruin WB. 2015
Communicating uncertainty in seasonal and
interannual climate forecasts in Europe. Phil. Trans.
R. Soc. A 373, 20140454. (doi:10.1098/rsta.
2014.0454)
189. Kent S. 1994 Sherman Kent and the Board of
National Estimates: Collected Essays (DP Steury
ed.). Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the
Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
190. MacKay RS, Kenna R, Low RJ, Parker S. 2017
Calibration with confidence: a principled method
for panel assessment. R. Soc. open sci. 4, 160760.
(doi:10.1098/rsos.160760)
191. Cooper WH, Gallupe RB, Pollard S, Cadsby J. 1998
Some liberating effects of anonymous electronic
brainstorming. Small Group Res. 29, 147–178.
(doi:10.1177/1046496498292001)
192. Latané B, Williams KD, Harkins S. 1979 Many hands
make light the work: the causes and consequences
of social loafing. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 37, 822–832.
(doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.6.822)
193. Herbert TT, Estes RW. 1977 Improving executive
decisions by formalizing dissent: the corporate
devil’s advocate. Acad. Manage. Rev. 2,
662–667. (doi:10.2307/257518)
194. Greitemeyer T, Schulz-Hardt S, Brodbeck FC, Frey
D. 2006 Information sampling and group decision
making: the effects of an advocacy decision
procedure and task experience. J. Exp. Psychol.
Appl. 12, 31–42. (doi:10.1037/1076-898X.12.1.31)
195. Schulz-Hardt S, Jochims M, Frey D. 2002 Productive
conflict in group decision making: genuine and
contrived dissent as strategies to counteract
biased information seeking. Organ. Behav. Hum.
Decis. Process. 88, 563–586. (doi:10.1016/S0749-
5978(02)00001-8)
196. Anderson KJ, Leaper C. 1998 Meta-analyses of
gender effects on conversational interruption:
who, what, when, where, and how. Sex Roles 39,
225–252. (doi:10.1023/A:1018802521676)
197. Brescoll VL. 2012 Who takes the floor and why:
gender, power, and volubility in organizations.
Admin. Sci. Quart. 56, 622–641. (doi:10.1177/
0001839212439994)
198. Ng SH, Brooke M, Dunne M. 1995 Interruption and
influence in discussion groups. J. Lang. Soc.
Psychol. 14, 369–381. (doi:10.1177/0261927X950
144003)
199. Larson JR, Foster-Fishman PG, Keys CB. 1994
Discussion of shared and unshared information in
decision-making groups. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
67, 446–461. (doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.
3.446)
200. Dalkey N, Helmer O. 1963 An experimental
application of the DELPHI method to the use of
experts.Manage. Sci. 9, 458–467. (doi:10.1287/
mnsc.9.3.458)
201. Rowe G, Wright G. 1999 The Delphi technique as a
forecasting tool: issues and analysis. Int. J.
Forecast. 15, 353–375. (doi:10.1016/S0169-2070(99)
00018-7)
202. Gürçay B, Mellers BA, Baron J, Lorenz J, Rauhut H,
Schweitzer F, Helbing D. 2014 The power of social
influence on estimation accuracy. J. Behav. Decis.
Making 261, 9020–9025.
203. Bar-Hillel M. 1980 The base-rate fallacy in
probability judgments. Acta Psychol. 44, 211–233.
(doi:10.1016/0001-6918(80)90046-3)
 on August 17, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
